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IN THE SUPREME COURT Of THE
STATE OF UTAH
YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY )
and YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY, INC.,

/
1

Plaintiffs, \ Case
No. 8383

STATE

T=~ COMMISSION,
Defendant.

1

f(J£1'1.Y

PLAINTIFFS'/ BRIEF
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The defendant, in its brief, agreed with the
statement of facts set forth in plaintiffs' brief and
did not modify plaintiffs' statement of facts or enlarge
it. The facts involved are not, then, in dispute.
Plaintiffs have moved to strike portions of defendant's brief which plaintiffs claim is outside the
evidence. This brief will discuss defendant's brief as
if the portions complained of were stricken.
1
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE SALES TAX ACT RENDERS TAXABLE THE
SALE OF SERVICES ONLY WHEN THOSE SERVICES ARE
RENDERED BY CERTAIN PUBLIC UTILITIES NAMED IN
THE ACT. NO SUCH SERVICES ARE INVOLVED IN THIS
CASE.

POINT II
IN ITS BRIEF DEFENDANT CITES AS AUTHORITY
FOR THE TAXATION OF THE Sl\L~ OF SERVICES, CERTAIN REGULATIONS WHICH DcJ,>1rHEIR TERMS, LEVY
A TAX UPON THE SALE OF SERVICES. THESE ARE THE
VERY REGULATIONS WHOSE VALIDITY IS CALLED
INTO QUESTION BY THE PLAINTIFFS.

·P..OINT III
IN ITS BRIEF DEFENDANT ASSERTS THAT IT HAS
NOT LEVIED A TAX UPON SERVICES IN THE INSTANT
CASE, WHEREAS, IT HAS IN FACT DONE SO.

POINT IV
IN RELATION TO THE TAXATION OF CHARGES
MADE UNDER "RE-VvRITES," DEFENDANT SEEKS TO
AVOID THE CLEAR MEANING AND INTENT OF ITS
STIPULATION.

POINTV
PLAINTIFFS AGREE WITH THE PROPOSITION SET
FORTH AS THE DEFENDANT'S POINT III.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SALES TAX ACT RENDERS TAXABLE THE
SALE OF SERVICES ONLY WHEN THOSE SERVICES ARE
RENDERED BY CERTAIN PUBLIC UTILITIES NAMED IN
THE ACT. NO SUCH SERVICES ARE INVOLVED IN THIS
CASE.

Under Point I of its brief (page 3) defendant
states that the excise tax on retail sales is not limited
to a tax on the sale of tangible personal property.
This is true. Only the portion of the Sales Tax Act
concerned in this case, Sec. 59-15-4 (a), U.C.A., 1953,
is so limited. Portions of the Sales Tax Act which
have no bearing whatever ori this case do tax things
other than the retail sale of tangible personal property. For example, Sec. 59-15-4 (b) levies a tax on
the sale of services by certain public utilities, Sec.
59-1 S-4 (c) levies a tax on the full price of meals furnished, and Sec. 59-15-4 (d) levies a tax on the sale
of admfssion to places of amusement, entertainment
or recreation. Since none of the above cited sections
of the Sales Tax Act have any bearing whatever on
the case at bar, plaintiffs did not feel it necessary to
refer to them in its argument, or to modify its arguments or statements in consideration of those sections.
Defendant takes issue with plaintiff's statement
that the proposition is· elementary that the Sales Tax
Act does not tax the sale of services, and cites in sup-
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port of its position certain references in the act to the
taxation of services. Again, it did not seem necessary
to plaintiffs to modify their statement that the sale
of services is not taxable by saying "except for the
sale of services by public utilities having no connection with this case." This is particularly so in view of
the statement of the defendant in its Fourth Biennial
Report quoted at page 19 of plaintiffs' brief as follows:
"The Emergency Revenue Act, better
known as the 'Sales Tax Act' has been in effect
in this state since June 1, 1933. This Act imposes a two per cent tax on retail sales of tangible personal property, certain service rendered by public utilities, sales of meals, and
the amount paid for admission to a place of
amusement or recreation. * * *"
( Citalics
added.)
It is no answer to the proposition that the sale
of services of the type rendered by these plaintiffs,
viz., repair and maintenance services, is not taxable,
to say that the sale of services is taxable when rendered by certain public utilities. Yet this is one of
the arguments to which the Defendant's Brief is devoted under point I.
POINT II
IN ITS BRIEF DEFENDANT CITES AS AUTHORITY
FOR THE TAXATION OF THE S~~ OF SERVICES, CERTAIN REGULATIONS WHICH D~1rHEIR TERMS, LEVY
A TAX UPON THE SALE OF SERVICES. THESE ARE THE
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VERY REGULATIONS WHOSE VALIDITY IS CALLED
INTO QUESTION BY THE PLAINTIFFS.

Under Point I of its brief, defendant seeks to
answer the plaintiffs' contention that the portion of
the Sales Tax Act with which this case is concerned is
limited to a tax on the sale of tangible personal property (a contention stated and re-stated by the defendant in its Biennial Reports as quoted in plaintiffs' brief
on pages 18 to 20 inclusive) by rna king the following
statement:
"The tax also applies to the sale of services
where they cannot be or are not separated
from the sale of tangible personal property.
For example, where a furniture store sells
furniture and agrees to deliver it without additional charge, the store cannot deduct the
cost of delivery from the selling price. A
restaurant prepares meals and collects tax on
the total price for the meal."
The exa1nple of the restaurant comes under subsection 4 (c) of the Sales Tax Act and has no a pplication to transactions taxable under subsection 4 (a).
The example of the delivery of furniture specifically
refers to an instance vvhere no additional charge
is made for the service of delivery. No tax is imposed on free service, and no one contends that the
cost of furnishing service for ·which a merchant does
not charge, for example air conditioning, the packaging, free delivery, etc., can be deducted from the sales
tax return.
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In the case at bar, a customer may buy the sign
at the cash sale price and make his own arrangement
for maintenance and repair service on the sign, either
with the plaintiffs or one of their competitors, or the
customer may enter into a agreement with the company where the sum of the monthly payments he
pays over the life of the contract consists of ( 1) the
cash sale price (48.74% of the total contract price)
and (2) the charge for maintaining and servicing
the sign for the period of the contract ( 51.26% of the
total contract price). (See stipulation 16, page 8 of
plaintiffs' brief.) To claim that the transactions in
the instant case, carefully delineated by stipulation,
are in any way analagous to the free delivery example given by defendant, is a misleading distortion.
Reference is made by defendant to the provision
of the rental agreement providing for liquidated
damages in the amount of three-fourths of the unpaid rental at the time of the breach of contract by
the customer. Defendant then says: "The company
tries to argue that only one-half the rentals paid
constitute the fair selling price * * * This would
seem to be inconsistent."
In considering this contention of the defendant
it should be noted:
1. The plaintiffs don't try to argue that only
one-half the rentals paid constitute the fair selling
6
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price," the defendant stipulated that to be the fact.
Stipulations 15 and 16 state:
"15. The purpose of the amount in excess of the cash sale price charged the customer
over the rental period is to compensate the
company for servicing and maintaining the
sign during the period, which servicing and
maintaining includes the furnishing of parts
and materials which are not separately taxed.
In the case of a 36 months contract, approximately 39% of the total rental charged is for
service and maintenance, including parts and
materials, and in the case of a 60 months contract, approximately 55% of the total rental
charged is for service and maintenance, including parts and materials.
"16. An analysis of the rentals contracted for during the entire period of this
audit shows that the cash sales price was equal
to 48.74% of the total amounts receivable for
the signs to which said cash sales price applies.
Or, stated conversely, the receipts for servicing
and maintaining said signs, including parts
and materials, during the period of the audit
was 51.26% of the total amounts received from
them during the original lease period." (Italics
added)
2. There is no inconsistency between the fact
stipulated to and the liquidated damages provision.
The provision setting liquidated damages at threefourths of the unpaid rentals is designed to approximate the damages the company will suffer by way
of loss of profit, unrecovered costs expended, etc., the
7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ordinary components of damages for breach of contract. Many Utah cases discuss liquidated damages
and the proper components of them. By its terms,
quoted by defendant, this provision encompasses
those components. There is no relation between
that figure and the breakdown in the charges between
compensation for the sign itself (cash sale price) and
compensation for repair and maintenance of the sign
(the other 51.26% of the total rental ch~rged), nor
is any relation intended.
In many places throughout its brief, defendant
confuses facts stipulated to by it with positions taken
by the plaintiffs by way of argument. For example,
on page 8 defendant makes the following statement:
"In connection with the rewrite contracts
this same form rental contract is used. They
maintain that none of the rentals from rewrites
should be taxable because it all represents
maintenance but still they have the same provision for damages." (Italics added.)
It is true that plaintiffs maintain that none of
the rentals from re-writes should be taxable because
it all represents maintenance. \Ve maintain it because it is the fact, a fact stipulated to by the defendant as follows:
"17. * * *The rental during that re-write
period is for the purpose of compensating the
company for maintaining and repairing the
8
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sign, which includes the parts and materials,
together with a reasonable profit."
On pages 9 and 10 of defendant's brief is cited a
number of examples from Sales Tax Regulation 58
wherein the Tax Commission has levied and assessed
sales tax on services rendered by certain contractors
and installers in connection with the sale of their
goods, unless the charge for the installation of the
goods sold is separately stated on the invoice to the
customer. That regulation is cited to prove that the
Sales Tax [1 ct taxes services _unless the charge for
them is separated on the invoice. This regulation
proves nothing except that it has been promulgated.
This regulation is one of the acts of the Commission
which is by necessary implication under attack in
this case and the issue is whether the Commission can,
by regulation, tax the sale of services simply because
of the manner of billing.
The plaintiffs complain that the Commission
seeks to tax charges for services (charges it expressly
says are not subject to sales tax if made separately)
on the basis that if they are included in a lump sum
charge along with the sales price of the tangible
personal property involved they become taxable.
Where in the Sales Tax Act has the Legislature abdicated its power to designate what may be taxed
and what may not be? That the Commission has exercised that po\Nf'l" cannot be taken as proof that the
9
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Sales Tax Act gave it the power, or that it exercised
the power lawfully.
In the instant case the Commission has repeatedly told the plaintiffs, "if you'll separate the 51.26% of
your rental ch~rges which are for maintenance and
repair from the 48.74% of your rental charges which
are for the sales price of the sign, the maintenance
and repair charges will not be taxed," presumably
because they are not subject to sales tax under the
Sales Tax Act (stipulation 25). Plaintiffs have
answered that if those charges are not taxable under
the Sales Tax Act when separated, they are not taxable under the Sales Tax Act when combined with the
cash sales price charged for the sign. From the
plaintiffs' books, as this audit and the stipulation
clearly shows, it can be readily ascertained exactly
what charges are for maintenance and repair service
and what charges are· for the cash sale price of the
sign. There is no administrative inconvenience or
uncertainty whatsoever involved in this case.
After arguing that "services" are subject to sales
tax, the defendant states that· the Tax Comm~ssion
has never attempted to tax them as such (page 11
of defendant's brief). Surely the Tax Commission
vvould levy a sales tax on "services" if the Sales Tax
Act made them taxable. It would be the duty of the
Commission to do so and it cannot be assumed that
the Commission would wilfully fail to comply with
its duty.
10
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POINT III
IN ITS BRIEF DEFENDANT ASSERTS THAT IT HAS
NOT LEVIED A TAX UPON SERVICES IN THE INSTANT
CASE, WHEREAS, IT HAS IN FACT DONE SO.

The defendant argues that, insofar as the proceeds from original rental agreements, re-writes and
options are concerned, they do not seek to tax charges
for ''services" because, by definition, "services" are
acts performed for "another" and in the instant case
the maintenance and repair labor is expended upon
the plaintiffs' own signs. This argument is fallacious
for two reasons; first, the defendant has stipulated
that the charges it seeks to tax are charges for "service," said, second, the charges made for keeping the
signs in good working order are charges for labor
performed for the benefit of "another," i.e., the
customer.
1. The defendant has stipulated that the
charges it seeks to tax are charges for "service." This
is shown by the following stipulation of fact:
"1S. The purpose of the amount in excess of the cash sale price charged the customer
over the rental period is to compensate the
company for servicing and maintaining the
sign during the period, which servicing and
maintaining includes the furnishing of parts
and materials which are not separately taxed.
In the case of a 36 months contract, approximately 39% of the total rental charged is for
11
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service and maintenance, including parts and
materials, and in the case of a 60 months contract, approximately 55% of the total rental
charged is for service and maintenance, including parts and materials.
In the face of the above stipulation by the defendant it is hard for the plaintiffs to see how defendant can seriously urge that the charge which is involved in this case is not a charge for maintenance
and repair "service." Again defendant seeks to confuse the issue by stating that a fact stipulated to by it
is merely a proposition urged by the plaintiffs.
2. The charges made for keeping the sign in
good working order are charges for labor performed
for the benefit of "another," i.e., the customer.
As is shown by stipulation 21, the sign manufactured for the customer is of use only to the
customer for whom it is manufactured. He is the
person to whom it is important that the sign operate
properly and be maintained. As set forth in stipulation 22 the sign has no salvage value to the company once it is installed. It has the same value to
the company, that is, none, whether maint~ined and
repaired or unmaintained and unrepaired. Lack of
maintenance could not reduce its salvage value below
the value stipulated, that is, below nothing.
For whom then, is the labor and effort to. keep
the signs in good running order and appearance ex12
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i

pended? For the custmner upon whose place of business the sign is placed. The labor of maintaining
and repairing the sign is performed by the plaintiffs
for the benefit of another~ the customer. Plaintiffs
are then, performing and selling "services" under
rental agreements, re-writes and options, as well as
under maintenance contracts.
As the stipulation of facts shows, a customer of
these plaintiffs has several choices before him. He
may buy the sign outright for its full cash sales price
and thereafter have it rnaintained and repaired under
a "mainte_nance contract," or he may enter into a
rental contract for 36 to 60 months. As is the case
if he purchases the sign, the customer has full use of
the sign, but instead of having a substantial initial
investment the customer has his payment of the
cash sale price spread over the 36 to 60 month period
in combination with his payments for maintenance.
Under either system his cost is the same. CStipulation
2+.)
True, at the expiration of the 36 to 60 month
period involved in the rental agreement, the company
owns the sign, not the customer. This would be a disadvantage ·were it not for the fact that the customer
may continue ad infinitum to use the sign by simply
paying for its maintenance under a "re-write" the
same amount he would pay under a "maintenance
contract." (Stipulations 17 and 18.) Since the sign
13
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has no salvage value to the company, once installed;
and the company gets paid the same amount for the
sign over the years whether the customer buys it
and makes a maintenance contract or enters into a
rental agreement with re-writes, the only material
difference between the two methods is that so long
as the company owns the sign it is assured of getting
the maintenance work on it. Since the bulk of the
company's work is maintenance work, this is inlportant to the company and it encourages the "rental
agreement" method of acquiring the use of a sign by
allowing the "cash sales price" to be spread over
the whole original rental period without extra charge
(stipulation 24) instead of requiring the cash sale
price to be paid in full at the time the sign is manufactured as is the case with the "outright sale plus
maintena~ce agreement" system.
The company claims that the difference in form
ought not to effect a different sales tax result between
the two systems, and further claims that the sales
tax act does not authorize a difference in treatment.
The Commission has levied a sales tax on "services" in the instant case and has done so purely on
the basis of form instead of substance.
All the plaintiffs ask is to receive the same
consideration that is afforded ·funeral directors in
P liminating from sales tax the charge made for
1-t.
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"services." The plaintiffs believe it is entitled to that
consideration as a matter of lavv.
POINT IV
IN RELATION TO THE TAXATION OF CHARGES
MADE UNDER "RE-WRITES," DEFENDANT SEEKS TO
AVOID THE CLEAR MEANING AND INTENT OF ITS
STIPULATION.

On pages 16 and 17 of its brief the Commission
makes the following statement relative to stipulation
0.
1"-'•
"Paragraph 12 of the Stipulation of Facts
states that 'a maintenance agreement is executed for a new term.' This is in fact a misstatement because the parties have agreed that
a 'maintenance agreement' is one executed for
the maintenance of a sign owned by the
customer and is executed on the form found on
page T-067 of the Transcript. The Stipulation,
in the same paragraph 12, goes on to say, 'the
agreements are on the same form as the original rentals which is the form found at T-066,
and are termed 're-writes' on the books of the
company.' This is correct. It has never been
stipulated that the re-writes are 'maintenance
agreements.' " ·

The Commission has stipulated that "re-writes"
are in substance and essence, though not in form,
"maintenance agreenzents." When the following
stipulations are read together, as they must be if the

15
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proper meaning of the whole of the stipulation is to be
understood, the fact that a "re-write" is merely a
"maintenance agreement" by another name-as the
Commission stipulated-is made clear:
"12. If the customer, at the end of the
original rental period, desires to continue to
use the sign, a maintenance agreement is executed for a new term, on the basis of 50% of
the original monthly charge. The agreements
are on the same form as the original rentals
and are termed "re-writes' on the books of the
company.
"17. During the re-write period, because
of the increased age of the sign, the cost of
maintaining the same is greater than the maintenance expense during the original rental
period. The rental during that re-write period
is for the purpose of compensating the company for maintaining and repairing the sign,
which includes the parts and materials, together with a reasonable profit.
"18. The entire cost of any signs placed
vvith the customer under a rental agreement
is amortized over the period of the original
term of that agreement so that, at the expiration of the original lease period the sign is completely written off as an asset of the company.
At that time the company eliminates from the
contract price for the rental of the sign that
portion of the rental which it attributed to recovering the cash sale price and re-writes the
contract at a price approximately equal to
what would be charged for the service and
16
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maintenance of the sign, were it the property
of the customer."
Had it not been the intent and meaning of stipulation 12 that a "re-write" is a "maintenance agreement" in its essential nature, there would have been
no reason for putting in the second sentence of stipulation 12. That sentence points out that, although the
re-write" is a "maintenance agreement," it is on a
different form from the "maintenance agreement"
used when the title to the sign is in the customer.
On page 24 of its brief, defendant refers to the
"de minimus" rule and states that it cannot apply
when a sum as large as $39,1 0'7 .55 is concerned. The
amount concerned is, at the most, 2% of $39,107.55,
but the principle of the "de minimus" rule is that
where the arriount under discussion is small in relation to the whole, it may be disregarded. It is a rule
of relative values or importances. In the instant case,
the cost of materials used in repair sales was 6% of
the whole amount charged for repair sales. This is
fixed by the defendant's own audit and the statement
of facts agreed to by defendant.
POINTV
PLAINTIFFS AGREE WITH THE PROPOSITION SET
FORTH AS THE DEFENDANT'S POINT III.

Point III of the defendant's brief reads as follows:
"Parts and materials used in the fulfilling

17
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of maintenance contracts are consu1ned by the
company and tax should be paid on their cost
of said parts and materials."
This proposition must be read in connection with
the portion of stipulation 7 which states:
"It is agreed that the proper measure of
the tax to be charged for the materials used
in maintaining and repairing signs under
maintenance agreements should be the same
as is charged for those materials used under
"repair sales."
If the proper measure of the sales tax on materials used under maintenance agreements is two per
cent of the cost of those materials .to the company,
and it is stipulated that the tax to be charged for
materials used in "repair sales" is to be the same, it
would follow that the proper measure for the sales
tax to be charged on materials used in "repair sales"
is two per cent of the cost thereof. This agrees with
plaintiffs arguments in Point IV of their brief, and is
correct.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in plaintiffs' brief and in
this reply brief, it is respectfully urged that the decision of the court in this case be as prayed in plaintiffs' brief heretofore filed.
Respectfully submitted,
EARL D. TANNER
.·l ttorney for Plaintiffs

18
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